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POINT I
THE OCTOBER 8f 1981 ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE DOES NOT BAR
SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST ZIONS FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES
AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST.
The relevant facts in this matter are as stated in
plaintiff's Brief dated November 12, 1985. Defendant's Brief
dated January 15f 1986 gives the Court a detailed history of the
litigation between the parties to this matter concerning the
validity of the Probate Court's October 8, 1981 Order.

That

litigation has no bearing on the issues before the Court on this
appeal.

For purposes of this appeal, plaintiffs do not question

the validity of the October 8f 1981 Order.

They merely question

the scope of that Order's preclusive effect.

Plaintiffs contend

that the October 8, 1981 Order does not bar either claims for
fraud against the personal representative of the Jerome 3. Pepper
estate or any claims against the trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper
inter vivos trust.

This Reply Brief is limited to discussion of

plaintiffs1 right to assert claims against the trustee in spite of
the October 8r 1981 Order.
Pike v. Markham, 633 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1981), is the only
modern authority Zions cites to support its argument that
plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee is barred.
point.

Pike is not on

There, the court determined only that certain claims

against the executors of an estate did not survive a decree of

final settlement in connection with that estate.

Plaintiffs in

Pike asserted no separate claims against a trustee such as those
at issue in this case.

They characterize their suit as an action

"to recover damages based primarily upon a breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, malfeasance and misfeasance in the office of the
executor."

Id. at 945 (emphasis added).

The court in Pike noted

that "the claims in this case were made against the executors."
Id. at 947 (emphasis added).

Thus, the court in Pike never had

occasion to address the issue this appeal presents:

Does the

liability of the trustee of an existing inter vivos trust for
failure to pursue a claim against itself as personal representative survive an order discharging the personal representative?
Aside from its misleading attempts to bolster the feeble
authority which supports its position, Zions makes three arguments
on behalf of the lower court's ruling that plaintiffs1 claims
against the trustee are barred.

First, that the trustee's

liability depends on a determination that the personal representative breached its duties to plaintiffs and that such a determination would be inconsistent with the order discharging the
personal representative.

Second, that plaintiffs' claims aaainst

the trustee are barred because plaintiffs could have litigated
those claims in the proceeding that led to the October 8, 1981
Order.

Finally, that certain policy considerations make it

desirable to bar plaintiffs's claims against the trustee.
Zions first argument relies on the concept of issue
-2-

preclusion.

As plaintiffs's Brief has already shown, an order

that results from an uncontested proceedinq cannot give rise to
any issue preclusion.

Zions first argument is therefore

groundless.
Zions second argument is a forced attempt to make claim
preclusion applicable to this case.

If Zions could establish that

plaintiffs could have asserted their claims against the trustee in
the probate proceedings, claim preclusion might apply to bar those
claims.

Thus Zions argues that plaintiffs knew in advance of the

hearing on the personal representative's petition for discharge
that the trustee concurred with that petition.

Zions would have

the Court believe that plaintiffs could therefore have pressed
their claim against the trustee for dereliction of its duty to
object to the personal representative's petition at the hearing on
that petition.

This is nonsense.

Plaintiffs claim against the trustee for permitting entry
of the October 8, 1981 Order accrued, like any other claim, when
plaintiffs were injured.

Zions failure to perform its trust did

no injury until the court entered the October 8, 1981 Order which
arguably barred certain claims.

Plaintiffs may have had reason to

believe that Zions had breached its trust before any injury
occurred.

But knowledge of a breach of duty does not make a cause

of action by itself.

A pedestrian has no cause of action against

a motorist merely because the motorist drives in a negligent
manner.

The pedestrian only has a cause of action when the
-3-

motorist1s negligence causes him some injury.
Plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee is for the trustee's
breach of its contractual duty to object to the personal representative's final accounting.

Zions argument is essentially that the

trustee repudiated that duty before entry of the October 8, 1981
Order, and that plaintiffs should have made their claim against
the trustee as soon as it made the repudiation clear.
was hired and paid to protect the plaintiffs.

The trustee

It is ridiculous to

argue that the plaintiffs should have anticipated that their paid
protector would violate its trust.
Moreover, normally a suit for breach of contract is only
appropriate when one party fails to perform a contractual duty as
it falls due.

See 17A C.J.S., Contracts §532 at 1027 ("[A]s a

rule an action on a contract commenced before the time of
performance arrives is premature.").
to the final

The trustee's duty to object

accounting could not fall due until it first had an

opportunity to object.

Its first opportunity to object formally

was in connection with the hearing on the personal representative's
final accounting.
Under certain circumstances, the doctrine of anticipatory
breach does permit a suit for breach of contract as soon as the
breaching party repudiates its contractual obligation.

For

several reasons, however, that doctrine does nothing to support
Zions position.
First, a repudiation must be clear and unequivocal to
-4-

support a suit for anticipatory breach.

See

Covington Brothers

v. Valley Plastering, Inc., 566 P.2d 814 (Nev. 1977) ("A
contractual anticipatory repudiation must be clear, positive, and
unequivocal.")*

The trustee's silent acquiesence does not

constitute a clear, unequivocal repudiation.

Second, there can be

no anticipatory breach of a unilateral contract.

See Sethre v.

Washington Education Assn., 591 P.2d 838 (Wash. 1979); Greguhn v.
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 461 P.2d 285, 23 Utah 2d 214
(1969); 11 S. Williston, Contracts, §1326 at 146 (3d ed. 1968).
Since the trustee owed plaintiffs a duty and plaintiffs had no
corresponding duty to the trustee, their relationship is closely
analagous to a unilateral contract.

Finally, an anticipatory

breach gives the aggrieved party an option to sue immediately, it
does not require him to do so.

He may ignore the repudiation

without prejudicing his rights.

See Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d

425, 123 Cal. Reptr. 641 (1975).
In its attempt to argue that claim preclusion bars
plaintiffs' claims against the trustee, Zions relies heavily on
the trustee's presence before the Probate Court as a party to the
personal representative's petition.

Zions does not, however,

explain why the trustee's presence before the court should change
the preclusive effect of the court's Order.

Plaintiffs could not

have asserted their claim against the trustee for permitting entry
of the October 8, 1981 Order in the proceedings that led to that
Order.

That Order cannot therefore bar their claim, regardless of
-5-

who was a party to those proceedings.
Zions final argument, that policy considerations should
lead the Court to hold plaintiffs' claims against the trustee
barred, is irrevelant.

Every defendant could present any number

of reasons why the public would be served if he were sheltered
from liability.

Such arguments have nothing to do with the

applicability of res judicata.

Res judicata cannot bar

plaintiffs' claims against the trustee just because Zions thinks
such a result would be a good thing.

The only policy concerns

relevant to this appeal are those which underly res judicata.
That doctrine is aimed at preventing multiple litigation of the
same claim.

Its goal would not be furthered by a ruling that

plaintiffs' claims against the trustee are barred.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis for holding that plaintiffs' claims
against the trustee are barred.

This Court should therefore

reverse the lower court's order dismissing those claims.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 1986.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
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J. Peter Mulhern, being duly sworn, says:
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam &
Hatchf attorneys for appellants.
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of
Appellants1 Reply Brief upon the parties to the within described
action by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Respondent
800 Kennecott Buildinq
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84133
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first
class, postage prepaid, on the 31st day of March, 1986.
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